

Building the UA/ Eller/ MIS AZSecure Cybersecurity Analytics Program: My Journey

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SKM, October 8, 2021

Funding Acknowledgements: NSF (SaTC, SFS, ACI)



Outline

- **Security Informatics & Analytics:** COPLINK, BorderSafe, Dark Web
- **Azsecure Cybersecurity Analytics:**
 - (1) **Dark Web Analytics** for studying international hacker community, forums, and markets;
 - (2) **Privacy and PII (Personally Identifiable Information) Analytics** for identifying and alleviating privacy risks for vulnerable populations;
 - (3) **Adversarial Malware Generation and Evasion** for adversarial AI in cybersecurity; and
 - (4) **Smart Vulnerability Assessment** for scientific workflows and OSS (Open Source Software) vulnerability analytics and mitigation.

Computational Design Science Research at UA/Eller/MIS AI Lab

- Applications/problems: digital libraries, search engines, biomedical informatics, healthcare data mining, security informatics, business intelligence, **cybersecurity analytics**
- Approaches: web collection/spidering, databases, data warehousing, data mining, text mining, web mining, **statistical NLP, machine learning, deep learning**, ontologies, social media analytics, interface design, information visualization, economic modeling, assessment
- Structure: **federal funding (NSF/DOD/NIH)**, director, affiliated faculty, post-docs, Ph.D./MS/BS students → **tech transfer, commercialization**
- Major phases: DLI → **COPLINK** → Dark Web → **AZSecure**

Security Informatics & Analytics: COPLINK & Dark Web

D-Lib Magazine
July/August 1998

ISSN 1082-9873

NSF/DARPA/NASA Digital Libraries Initiative

A Program Manager's Perspective

Stephen M. Griffin
Division of Information and Intelligent Systems (IIS)
Program Director: Special Projects Digital Libraries Initiative
National Science Foundation
Arlington, Virginia USA
sggriffin@nsf.gov



Digital Government (DigitalGov)

Program Solicitation

NSF 04-521

Replaces Document 02-156



National Science Foundation

Directorate for Computer and Information Science and Engineering
Division of Information and Intelligent Systems

Global Security Impacts

- “War on terror” (Iraq and Afghanistan) surpassed cost of Second World War, \$5 trillion...Time Magazine
- Hacker costing \$1 trillion globally... President Obama



From the Surface Web to the Dark Web


Surface Web

Deep Web

Dark Web

DarkNet

Hacker Web




COPLINK: Crime Data Mining (1997-2009)

The screenshot displays the COPLINK web application interface, which is used for crime data mining. The interface is divided into several main sections:

- Person Search Form:** Located on the top left, it includes fields for Name (Last, First, Middle), Race (White/Hispanic), Sex (Male), Age (25-35), Height (508-600), Hair (Blonde/Brown), and Eyes. It also has checkboxes for "Search Past Descriptions" and "Show All Aliases Matching Description". Below the form is a table of search results with columns for Add, ID, Name, Birth Date, Race, Sex, Height, Weight, Hair, and Eyes.
- Person Details - TUCSON:** Located on the top right, it shows detailed information for a specific person: AREVALLES, RICHMOND O. It includes a photo, a list of aliases (ALBOT, RICHMOND; AREVALLES, RICHMOND; AREVALLES, SONNY; LYMBECK, RICHMOND; STINKO, RICHMOND O), and a table of descriptions with columns for Race, Sex, Height, Weight, Hair, Eyes, and Date.
- Visualizer:** Located at the bottom, it contains three main components:
 - Minigraph:** A circular network graph showing relationships between entities, with nodes represented by small icons and lines connecting them.
 - Map:** A geographical map of Tucson, Arizona, with red dots indicating crime locations. It includes a "Layers" panel on the left with options like "Pima Boundary", "City Areas", "Landmarks", "Washes", "Lakes", "Parks", "Golf Courses", "Wildness", "Runways", "Prisons", "Hospitals", and "Schools".
 - Bar Chart:** A bar chart titled "Day of Week" showing the number of documents per week for each day of the week (Sun, Mon, Tue, Wed, Thu, Fri, Sat).
 - Table:** A table at the bottom right showing a list of crime records with columns for "Sh...", "Desc", "CRIME TYPE", and dates (05/14/1978, 06/13/2006).

COPLINK Identity Resolution and Criminal Network Analysis



* Only the grayed datasets are available to the AI Lab

Border Security: High-risk Vehicle Identification (LPR + DM/SNA)



COPLINK: Crime Data Mining

ABC News April 15, 2003

Google for Cops: Coplink software helps police search for cyber clues to bust criminals

IBM i2 COPLINK

Accelerating law enforcement investigations

Palantir

(\$54B, IPO 2020)

Arts & Ideas
The New York Times
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2002

An Electronic Cop That Plays Hunches

Interconnecting Police Files Through New Computer System Helps Prosecutors in Sniper Case

By MINDY SINK

TUCSON, Oct. 28 — Officials building a case against the Washington-area sniper suspects are using a new investigative tool to help trace their movements across the country. It is an electronic-based system called Coplink, developed at an artificial intelligence laboratory here, that allows police departments to establish links quickly among their own files and to those of other departments.

During the 31 days in which suspects terrorized the area, investigators used everything from specialized ballistics testing to geographic and criminal profiles to track and identify suspects. Then, in what turned out to be the 14th hour of the pursuit, they finally reached out to Coplink. As it turned out, John Muhammad and Lee Malvo were arrested before it was fully installed, but now the post-arrest task force is using the system to help connect the dots.

All of the information that was collected — including that from other computer database systems like the Federal Bureau of Investigation's RapSheet — is now being downloaded into the Coplink database so that the accumulated data can be compared, said Robert Griffin, president of Knowledge Computing Corporation of Tucson, which is turning the prototype of the laboratory into a market product. "The more data you get, the better Coplink works," he said.

Coplink was designed by Hsinchun Chen, the director of the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at the University of Arizona. "It is the Google for law enforcement," he said, referring to a search engine that can search through an array of related Web sites. "Things that a human can do intuitively we are getting the computer to do, too."

During the sniper investigation, which generated hundreds of thousands of tips, the number of potential cases to administer was daunting. "We were mounting a massive effort," said Lt. Mitch Montgomery of the Montgomery County police. "We had tactical resources, the military, federal, state and local law enforcement agencies and information technology using several products where each one of these had a role." So when the National Institute of Justice, the Justice Department's research and development arm, suggested that the sniper task force try Coplink, the officials agreed.

While no one is suggesting old-fashioned detective work is being replaced by machines, the idea behind Coplink is to provide a computer program that can save busy police officers precious time and sometimes even help solve cases. That's some-



at the scene. "Sherry did it." The name Sherry was put into Coplink, and cross-referenced with the victim's personal data, and within minutes the records showed that the two men had been in prison together.

The program also allows users to look at lists of data or to create graphs and charts showing affiliations among different criminals.

At the moment, the Tucson Police Department is the only one in the country where Coplink is fully installed, although about a half-dozen other cities have begun to introduce Coplink into their existing computer systems. The cost of the program and

AP/Wide World
Chris Johnston for The New York Times



COPLINKBK Commercialization Timeline

- 1994-1997, NSF DLI projects, DL, SE
- 1997, NIJ \$1.2M project, UA/TPD
- 2000, NSF DG \$1.6M, UA/TPD/PPD
- 2000, KCC founding, UA tech transfer; \$2.6M VC funding
- 2001, Tucson, Phoenix, San Diego
- 2002, bubble burst, \$2M additional funding (anti-dilution clause)
- 2003, DC sniper investigation use, NYT cover article; AZ, CA, NJ, IL
- 2009, SilverLake PE fund; COPLINK + i2
- 2011, sold to IBM (\$500M); Chen exit
- 2017, IBM sold COPLINK to Forensic Logic


➔ **COPLINK is in use in 5,000+ law enforcement jurisdictions and intelligence agencies in the U.S. and Europe, making significant contribution to public safety worldwide.**

Dark Web: Countering Terrorism (2003-2014)


- Dark Web: Terrorists' and cyber criminals' use of the Internet
- Collection: Web sites, forums, blogs, YouTube, etc.
- 20 TBs in size, with close to 10B pages/files/messages (the entire LOC collection: 15 TBs)



Arabic Writeprint Feature for Authorship Analysis



CyberGate (Abbasi, et al., MISQ, 2008)



The Dark Web project in the Press



Project Seeks to Track Terror Web Posts, 11/11/2007




Researchers say tool could trace online posts to terrorists, 11/11/2007



Mathematicians Work to Help Track Terrorist Activity, 9/14/2007




ISI, Springer, 2006



- **Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI)** (Chen, 2006)
- Data, text, and web mining
- From COPLINK to Dark Web
- **IEEE ISI, EISIC, PAISI → 4000+ scholars, since 2003**

Dark Web, Springer, 2012



22 chapters, 451 pages, 150 illustrations (81 in color); Springer Integrated Series in Information Systems, 2012.

Selected TOC:

- Forum Spidering
- Link and Content Analysis
- Dark Network Analysis
- Interactional Coherence Analysis
- Dark Web Attribution System
- Authorship Analysis
- Sentiment Analysis
- Affect Analysis
- CyberGate Visualization
- Dark Web Forum Portal
- Case Studies: Jihadi Video Analysis, Extremist YouTube Videos, IEDs, WMDs, Women's Forums

AZSecure Cybersecurity Analytics Program (2010-present): SaTC, SFS, ACI

Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC)

PROGRAM SOLICITATION

NSF 21-500

REPLACES DOCUMENT(S):
NSF 19-603



National Science Foundation

Directorate for Computer and Information Science and Engineering
Division of Computer and Network Systems
Division of Computing and Communication Foundations
Division of Information and Intelligent Systems
Office of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure

CyberCorps(R) Scholarship for Service (SFS) Defending America's Cyberspace

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PROGRAM SOLICITATION

NSF 21-512

REPLACES DOCUMENT(S):
NSF 19-514



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nature doi:10.1038/nature16961

Mastering the game of Go with deep neural networks and tree search

David Silver^{1*}, Aja Huang^{1*}, Chris J. Maddison¹, Arthur Guez¹, Laurent Sifre¹, George van den Driessche¹, Julian Schrittwieser¹, Ioannis Antonoglou¹, Veda Panneshelvam¹, Marc Lanctot¹, Sander Dieleman¹, Dominik Grewe¹, John Nham², Nal Kalchbrenner¹, Ilya Sutskever², Timothy Lillicrap¹, Madeleine Leach¹, Koray Kavukcuoglu¹, Thore Graepel¹ & Demis Hassabis¹

nature doi:10.1038/nature24270

Mastering the game of Go without human knowledge

David Silver^{1*}, Julian Schrittwieser^{1*}, Karen Simonyan^{*}, Ioannis Antonoglou¹, Aja Huang¹, Arthur Guez¹, Thomas Hubert¹, Lucas Baker¹, Matthew Lai¹, Adrian Bolton¹, Yutian Chen¹, Timothy Lillicrap¹, Fan Hui¹, Laurent Sifre¹, George van den Driessche¹, Thore Graepel¹ & Demis Hassabis¹


AI & Deep Learning: From AlphaGo to Autonomous Vehicles (2012-)




Hacker Web, AZSecure projects at UA/MIS AI Lab (2010-present)

AI and Cybersecurity

- AI and Cybersecurity → not just buzzwords!
 - Noted as a national security priority by NSF, NSTC, and NAS.
- Role of AI for Cybersecurity :
 1. Automate common cybersecurity tasks
 2. Identify patterns in large datasets



AI for Cybersecurity – An Analytics Approach



MOVING TOWARD BLACK HAT RESEARCH IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY: AN EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE

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Introduction

The *MIS Quarterly* Special Issue on Information Systems Security in the Digital Economy received a total of 80 manuscripts from which we accepted nine for publication in the Special Issue. To introduce the readers to the special issue papers, we have chosen to digress from the tradition of summarizing the papers in-depth and, instead, would like to take this opportunity to encourage researchers to conduct

Black Hats Versus White Hats Versus Grey Hats

What exactly is this white hat versus the black hat dichotomy? When making movies about the Old American West, filmmakers made a symbolic distinction at times between the good guys, wearing white hats, and the bad guys, wearing black hats. If, for the sake of our basic theme, we can adopt this distinction momentarily, we would like to go on to asseverate that the information systems field is heavily over-emphasizing research on white hats to the detriment of studies on black hats. It is easy to see how this would, quite naturally, occur. Scholars have better access to white hats, although even here, white hat managers do not typically want to share detailed information about their losses and have responded in this manner for some time (Hoffer and Straub 1989). Thus it is a readier access to data that has led information security researchers to gravitate toward white hat issues.

Whereas we could offer more extensive evidence of the prevalence of white hat IS research studies, a quick review of the papers in this special issue indicates that only the paper by Abbasi, Zhang, Zimbra, Chen, and Nunamaker attempts to empirically represent the activities of black hats, but even with this representation, we are at arm's length from black hat motivations and future dark plans.

We need to state unequivocally that our argument for more emphasis on the black hat type of research in no way diminishes the contributions of the white hat papers in this special



Discoveries



When hackers talk, this research team listens

Online conversations help fill critical gap in cybersecurity knowledge about attackers' motivations, possible targets



Hsinchun Chen leads a research project that explores the motivations of cyberattackers. [Credit and Larger Version](#)



NSF-supported researchers have shed new light on how hackers communities interact.

[Credit and Larger Version](#)

October 8, 2015

Discoveries

Search Discoveries

About Discoveries

Discoveries by Research Area

Arctic & Antarctic

Astronomy & Space

Biology

Chemistry & Materials

Computing

Earth & Environment

Education

Engineering

Mathematics

Nanoscience

People & Society

Physics

Dark Web Analytics: studying international hacker community, forums, and markets

*** ACI, 2012-2017; SaTC 2013-2018; SFS-1, 2012-2018**
*** SaTC 2019-; SFS-2, 2019-**

Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC)

PROGRAM SOLICITATION

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Office of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure

Selected data breaches in 2014

Victim	Date	Ramification
Target	2013.12	40M credit/debit cards; 70M customer records; 46% drop in annual profits (seller: Rescator)
Neiman Marcus	2014.3	282K credit/debit cards
Sally Beauty	2014.3	25K credit/debit cards
P.F. Chang	2014.6	8 month of customer data from 33 stores
J.P. Morgan Chase	2014.8	83M accounts
UPS	2014.8	51 stores customers
Dairy Queen	2014.9	395 store systems
Home Depot	2014.9	56M credit/debit cards
Jimmy Jones	2014.9	216 store systems
Staples	2014.10	51 store systems

Yahoo confirms: hackers stole 500 million account details in 2014 data breach

Boohoo for Yahoo. State-sponsored attacker blamed for hack as users told to change passwords.

Graham Cluley | September 22, 2015 8:01 pm | Filed under: Data loss, Yahoo | 21


457 SHARES [Share on Twitter](#) [Share on Facebook](#) [+](#)



Are your data breached? Do you even know?

Data Breaches since 2005 (FTC, Clearinghouse, 2019)

- # of records breached: 11,582,808,013
- # of data breaches: 9,071



2016 Data Breach

- 1. Yahoo! : 3.5B user accounts
- 2. FriendFinder : 412M user accounts
- 3. MySpace : 360M passwords

DICE-E: A FRAMEWORK FOR CONDUCTING DARKNET IDENTIFICATION, COLLECTION, EVALUATION WITH ETHICS¹

Victor Benjamin




Figure 2. The DICE-E Framework

Identify Hacker Assets/Tools

Sagar Samtani (JMIS, January 2018)



Journal of Management Information Systems



ISSN: 0742-1222 (Print) 1557-928X (Online) Journal homepage: <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mmis20>

Exploring Emerging Hacker Assets and Key Hackers for Proactive Cyber Threat Intelligence

Sagar Samtani, Ryan Chinn, Hsinchun Chen & Jay F. Nunamaker Jr.

Hacker Asset/Tool Examples

03-07-2014

[Delphi] Noob Botnet Construct ← Exploit Name

just a old snippet by me which shows one of a possible construct to code a bot in delphi. enjoy it 😊

Code:

```
program autoStart;  
  
uses  
  Windows, Registry, Sysutils, ShellAPI, TLHelp32, WinTypes, Messages, WinProcs, WinInet, URLMon;  
  
var  
  str, OldName, NewName, NewDir, sPath, dURL: String;  
  Overwrite, Idle, AntiRE: Boolean;  
  i: Integer;  
  
{ -----Installation Konfiguration----- }  
Interval: Integer = 30; // Angabe in Sekunden  
  
const  
  sAutostartName = 'AutoStartTest'; // Name des Autostarteintrags  
  sFolderName = '\\2013'; // Ordnername Backslash muss davor stehn  
  sMutex = ''; // Mutex Name  
  sFilename = 'bin.exe'; // Dateiname  
{ ----- }  
  
procedure DoAppToRun(RunName, AppName: string);  
var  
  Reg: TRegistry;  
begin
```

Code to Execute Exploit

Ruffly
Senior Member
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: Germany
Posts: 247

08-08-2014 ← Post Date

Pos

hi guys, I found the subject published, these are two grabbers who already know

Blackpos
<http://i.imgur.com/yRKLqGGE.png>

Dexter v2
<http://i.imgur.com/gYmjfkC.png>

[?] Senior Member
Join Date: Dec 2010
Location: Russia
Posts: 165

Attachment Name

Description of Attachment

Attached Files

File Type: rar Blackpos.rar 5.4 KB, 143 views

Figure 1. Forum post with source code to create botnets

Figure 2. Forum post with BlackPOS malware attachment

airwawekz
Junior Member
Join Date: Oct 2014
Posts: 1
Like (Stats)
Mentioned: 0 Post(s)
Tagged: 0 Thread(s)
Quoted: 0 Post(s)

Tutorial] Malicious Documents -- PDF Analysis in 5 steps ← Thread title

PDF

Author related information

Instructions on how to create malicious documents


Mass mailing or targeted campaigns that use common files to host or exploit code have been and are a very popular vector of attack. In other words document received via e-mail or opened through a browser plug-in. In regards to malicious PDF files the security industry saw a significant increase of half of 2008 which might be related to Adobe Systems release of the specifications, format structure and functionality of PDF files.

Most enterprise networks perimeters are protected and contain several security filters and mechanism that block threats. However a malicious PDF is very successful passing through Firewalls, Intrusion Prevention Systems, Anti-spam, Anti-virus and other security controls. By reaching the victim mail leverage social engineering techniques to lure the user to click/open the document. Then, for example, if the user opens a PDF malicious file, it typically exploits a vulnerability when Adobe Reader parses the crafted file. This might cause the application to corrupt memory on the stack or heap causing as shellcode. This shellcode normally downloads and executes a malicious file from the Internet. The Internet Storm Center Handler Bojan Zornja writes of these shellcodes. In some circumstances the vulnerability could be exploited without opening the file and just by having a malicious file on the hard drive.

Figure 3. Tutorial on how to create malicious documents

AZSecure Hacker Assets Portal System

Data Collection and Analytics




Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) and Support Vector Machine (SVM) Analytics




987 tutorials, 15,576 source code, and 14,851 attachments

Web Hosting and Access



System Functionalities



Browsing




Searching




Downloading

System Analytics



Cyber Threat Intelligence Dashboard





VirusTotal Malware Analysis



AZSecure Hacker Assets Portal (**English, Russian, Arabic**)

Forum	Language	Date Range	# of Posts	# of Members	# of source code	# of attachments	# of tutorials
OpenSC	English	02/07/2005-02/21/2016	124,993	6,796	2,590	2,349	628
Xeksec	Russian	07/07/2007- 9/15/2015	62,316	18,462	2,456	-	40
Ashiyane	Arabic	5/30/2003 – 9/24/2016	34,247	6,406	5,958	10,086	80
tuts4you	English	6/10/2006 – 10/31/2016	40,666	2,539	-	2,206	38
exelab	Russian	8/25/2008 – 10/27/2016	328,477	13,289	4,572	-	628
Total:	-	02/07/2005- 10/31/2016	590,699	47,492	15,576	14,851	987

Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) Example – Bank Exploits (e.g., BlackPOS)



Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) Example – Mobile Malware



Labeling Hacker Exploits for Proactive Cyber Threat Intelligence: A Deep Transfer Learning Approach

Benjamin Ampel (MISQ, 2nd Round)

Literature Review: Hacker Forum Exploit Analysis

Year	Author	1. Data Source	2. Data Type Used	Analytics	Identified Exploits	3. Purpose
2019	Schafer et al.	General purpose forums	Forum titles, users, message, topic, keywords	SNA, LDA	Leaks, botnets, DDoS	Trend identification
2019	Benjamin et al.	General purpose forums	Post content, attachments, source code, keywords, reputation	OLS Regression	Rootkit, XSS, SQLi, DDoS, shellcode, drive-by	Darknet identification, collection, evaluation
2018	Williams et al.	General purpose forums	Sub-forum name, author, post content, attachment metadata	LSTM	Crypters, keyloggers, RATs, DDoS, SQLi	Exploit categorization
2018	Goyal et al.	Forums, Twitter, Blogs	Post content, Tweet content, blog content	LSTM, RNN	Trojan, Windows, Apple OSX, phishing	Cyber attack prediction
2018	Deliu et al.	Nullified.IO leak	Post content	SVM, CNN	Botnet, crypter, keylogger, malware, rootkit	Exploit categorization
2017	Samtani et al.	General purpose forums	Post content, assets, thread, author, source code	LDA, SVM	Crypters, keyloggers, RATs, botnets	Exploit categorization
2017	Grisham et al.	General purpose forums	Post content, date, author, role, attachments	RNN	Mobile malware	Malware identification/ Proactive CTI
2017	Deliu et al.	Nullified.IO leak	Post content	SVM, LDA	Backdoor, botnet, crypter, DDoS, exploit, malware, password, rootkit	Exploit categorization

- **Key Observations:**

1. Studies focus on general forums, but not exploit DNMs or public repositories.
2. Although source code contains valuable information, many studies omit them from analysis.
3. The most common task is to categorize post content by exploit category.

Proposed Research Design

Data Collection

```

tempread Created: 06 Dec 2007 15:59 - Corrected: tempread
Quote - Private message - # 1
Rank: 159.1
(veteran)
Status:
Member

$password=пароль, не фильтруется
$logins=логины, не фильтруется

$password=md5($password);
$logins=mysql_query("select * from usertable where
username='$login' and password='$password'");
$check = mysql_num_rows($logins);
if ($check>0) {
    Не авторизовались
};
    
```

Traditional Hacker Forums

```

macOS (prefs) Arbitrary File Write / Local Privilege Escalation Exploit
Author: Jungwon Lim Risk: Security Risk High Oday-ID
Category: local exploits Date add: 07-09-2020 CVE
Platform: macOS

def check
    version = Gem::Version.new(get_system_version)
    if version > Gem::Version.new('10.15.4')
        CheckCode:Safe
    elsif version < Gem::Version.new('10.15')
        CheckCode:Safe
    else
        CheckCode:Appears
    end
end
    
```

Exploit DNMs

```

Sophos VPN Web Panel 2020 Denial Of Service
Authorized by Bek Kiras

Sophos VPN Web Panel 2020 denial of service proof of concept.

steps exploit, web, denial of service, proof of concept

import requests
import sys
import random
import threading

def send_req():
    url = random.randint(9,22)
    payload = "..."
    headers = {"User-Agent": "test",
               "Cookie": "admin",
               "Host": "10.10.10.10"}
    class = "login_screen_login_button_left"
    class = "login_screen_login_button_right"
    language = "turkish"
    headers["Referer"] = "http://10.10.10.10"
    
```

Public Exploit Repositories

Pre-Processing and Dataset Construction


Programming Language Classifier

Remove stop words, low frequency words, and lemmatize

Tokenizer and Sequence Padder

Gold-Standard Dataset Construction

Deep Transfer Learning Exploit Labeler (DTL-EL) Model




Experiment 1: DTL-EL against prevailing classification methods on source domain

Experiment 2: DTL-EL against non-transfer learning approaches on target domain

Experiment 3: DTL-EL against transfer learning layer selection on target domain

Evaluations and Visualization

Benchmark Comparisons




Visualized Attention Comparison

```

def send req cnt randomrandint payload file my_data params usernametst
passwordadmin cookie submitdiv classlogin screen login button left dividiv right div
browser change values headers host addr sysargy hoststr useragent mozilla windows
nt win.xrv gecko firefox accept text javascript html application xml:acceptlanguage trt
tr q enus en:acceptencoding gzip deflate xrequestedwith xmlhttprequest
xprototyperevision rc contenttype json charsetutf:connection close cookiecookie if
want edit add added:requestsession simple
socket close function sendpacketii packet global proxy host port html regex
ocktsocopen gethostbyname ock echo response htmlentities die else c preg match
valid partsexplode connecting parts proxybr fputs feof htmlgets eregi chr xd xa
htmlfread fclose post:path num portintval trim numintval strlen error check ppath
phpht hostportpath hoststr replace m pathstr try see magic quotes gpc enable
packetget pmobile dwnldphppg e testinc http packetuseragent shareaza vxxxxrn
packethost hostnr packetconnection closernrn show testhttp
    
```


Results and Discussion: DTL-EL Model



Experiment 2: Internal against non-transfer learning models		Results			
Model	Layer Weights	Accuracy	Precision	Recall	F1
Naïve Bayes	Random	8.59% ***	18.09% ***	15.08% ***	16.45% ***
Logistic Regression	Random	37.16% ***	35.13% ***	38.85% ***	36.9% ***
XGBoost Decision Tree	Random	47.65% ***	48.87% ***	30.06% ***	37.22% ***
SVM	Random	48.72% ***	37.98% ***	27.38% ***	31.82% ***
RNN	Random	57.64% ***	62.89% ***	53.93% ***	57.62% ***
GRU	Random	61.34% ***	64.06% ***	59.27% ***	62.09% ***
LSTM	Random	62.39% ***	65.77% ***	60.49% ***	63.42% ***
BiLSTM	Random	63.05% ***	67.56% ***	59.71% ***	63.21% ***
BiLSTM w/ Attention	Random	63.38% ***	66.04% ***	61.88% ***	64.02% ***
DTL-EL (Our model)	Transferred	66.17%	68.25%	64.99%	66.61%

Case Study: System Integration

- Hacker exploit source code can be input for classification with attention weights.
- The system applies a DTL-EL label upon the collection of new hacker forum text, providing real-time information to researchers.
 - APIs allow for forums to be downloaded in their entirety with related programming languages and exploit labels for source code.

Hacker Exploit Dashboard

Label Your Exploit

Pick Your Model

DTL-EL ← **Select a model (DTL-EL or non-DTL) and input an exploit**

Input code snippet here:

```
SELECT UserId, Name, Password FROM Users WHERE UserId = 105 or 1=1;
```

Our model thinks this is a SQL Injection ← **Model output**

select **userid** name **password** users ← **Attention weights of the model output**

```
select userid name password users
```

Figure 16. Hacker Exploit Portal For Further Analysis

Detecting Cyber Threats with AI Agents: Multilingual, Multimedia DNM Content

Reza Ebrahimi (JMIS, MIS, IEEE PAMI)

Detecting Cyber Threats with AI Agents

- **Intelligence Source:** Dark web
 - A large conglomerate of platforms that facilitate illegal transactions among hackers
- **DarkNet Market Places** (Amazon for illegal products; hidden from search engines) → Attract cybercriminals
 - **Hacker Assets:** Hacking tools (Remote Access Trojan); malicious executables; hacking tutorials
 - **Non-Hacker Assets:** Digital goods (credit card information); copyrighted software; pirated e-books; counterfeits; drugs; forged documents

Dark Net Marketplaces (DNMs)

- Other 654
- Security 388
- Software 1061

- Digital Goods 43611
- Drugs 46109
- Drugs Paraphernalia 278
- Services 3835
- Other 3370

Exchange

BTC	1.0
mBTC	1000.0
USD	16088.0
EUR	13729.3
GBP	12040.6
CAD	20552.8
AUD	20758.8
SEK	134094.9
NOK	130044.7
DKK	102160.3
TRY	61054.5
CNH	105455.4
HKD	124855.0
RUB	931264.5
INR	1030953.6
JPY	1822398.0

Onion mirrors

- t3e6ly3u0if4zcw2.onion verified
- jd6yhuwcivehvd4.onion
- t3e6ly3u0if4zcw2.onion
- 7ep7acrknzdcw3l.onion
- vilpaqbrmvizecjo.onion
- igyifrhvxq33sy5.onion
- 6qlocfg6zq2kyacl.onion
- x3x2dwb7jasax6tq.onion
- bkjcpa2klkmmowwq.onion
- xytjqcfendzeby22.onion
- nhib6cwhfsoyiuvg.onion
- k3pd243s57ftnpa.onion

19 20 ... 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 →

Hacking For Newbies

0.0000621
HappyEyes (5200) (4.79★)
WW → WW

ESCROW Order

731986-Hacker's Desk Reference

0.0001864
color (8000) (4.76★)
SB → WW

ESCROW Order

Premium Carding Package

0.0003107
OnePiece (7400) (4.83★)
PH → WW

ESCROW Order

6 BITCOIN RANSOMWARE EASY MONEY SYSTEM

0.0003107
TheWealthMaker (1550) (4.78★)
WW → WW

ESCROW Order

Go to Windows updates anonymously

0.0000621
HappyEyes (5200) (4.79★)
WW → WW

ESCROW Order

HACK ANYONE USING THEIR IP ADDRESS

0.0002486
TopNotchMoneyMaker (4500) (4.74★)
WW → WW

ESCROW Order

PayPal - Scam Page (Phising site) [Looks Great]

0.00031
MicroDroper (2350) (4.91★)
WW → WW

ESCROW Order

PASSWORD MANAGER KIT

0.0001224
EiCartel (1800) (4.86★)
WW → WW

ESCROW Order

PayPal - Scam Page (Phising site) [Looks Great]


Vendor: MicroDroper (2350) (4.91★) (@ 67/1/3) **Seller**

Price: 0.00031 (\$4.99) **Price**

Ships to: Worldwide, Worldwide

Ships from: PM

Escrow: Yes



Product Description

You will get all files for build phishing PayPal site. Look perfect.

We are not include support to the product, so if you have 0% knowledge about site building and php - please do not make an order.

Shipping options

0.00 (\$0) You will get download link


Product Reviews Quantity: 1 **Add to cart**

Product ratings

53d ★★★★★ Enter your comments here


Essay I: Learning From Unlabeled Cybersecurity Content (JMIS, March 2020)

- Learning from examples → supervised by human-labeled data → Expensive!
- Unlabeled data improves cyber threat detection with **transductive learning theory**



$$\min_w \left(\frac{\lambda}{2} \|w\|^2 + \frac{1}{2L} \sum_{i=1}^L l(y_i, w^T x_i) + \frac{\lambda'}{2U} \sum_{j=1}^U l(y'_j, w^T x'_j) \right)$$




$$\text{subject to: } \frac{1}{U} \sum_{j=1}^U \max(0, \text{sign}(w^T x'_j)) = r$$



- Significantly decreased reliance on human supervision for cyber threat detection.

Essay II: Learning from Heterogeneous Cybersecurity Content (MISQ, Forthcoming)


- Cyber threat detection in non-English content → lack of non-English training data
- Transfer cyber threat knowledge from high-resource English platforms to non-English ones with **transfer learning theory**



- Significantly decreased reliance on human supervision and outperformed machine translation.

Essay III: Learning from Heterogeneous Cybersecurity Content (IEEE TPAMI, 2nd Round)

- Learning from two domains (multilingual text, source code, image representations)
- Align different data distributions & feature spaces with **domain adaptation theory**



- Enables heterogeneous data analytics (multilingual text, images) in any online market.

Privacy and PII (Personally Identifiable Information) Analytics:

identifying and alleviating privacy risks for vulnerable populations

(SaTC 2019-; SFS-2, 2019-)

Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC)

PROGRAM SOLICITATION

NSF 21-500

REPLACES DOCUMENT(S):

NSF 19-603



National Science Foundation

Directorate for Computer and Information Science and Engineering
Division of Computer and Network Systems
Division of Computing and Communication Foundations
Division of Information and Intelligent Systems
Office of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure

CyberCorps(R) Scholarship for Service (SFS)

Defending America's Cyberspace

PROGRAM SOLICITATION

NSF 21-580

REPLACES DOCUMENT(S):

NSF 19-521



National Science Foundation


Directorate for Education and Human Resources
Division of Graduate Education

Exploring Privacy Risk of Exposed Digital Personally Identifiable Information (PII): A Neighbor Attention-Based Approach

Fangyu Lin and Hsinchun Chen

Data Breaches since 2005 (FTC, Clearinghouse, 2019)

- # of records breached: 11,582,808,013
- # of data breaches: 9,071




2016 Data Breach

- 1. Yahoo! : 3.5B user accounts
- 2. FriendFinder : 412M user accounts
- 3. MySpace : 360M passwords

Revealing and Protecting PII: From Dark Web to Surface Web



- Surface Web
- Deep Web
- Dark Web
- DarkNet
- Hacker Web



IRB, HIPAA, **GDPR**, **PII**

→ Cybersecurity to Privacy

→ **Michael Bazzell** + From Dark Web to Surface Web



Dark Web Intelligence Sources (May, 2021)

Source	Description	Size*	Promising Attributes
Stolen Account Collection	Stolen social media and e-mail accounts	25 billions	Username
			Password
Stolen Credit Card - Tormarket	Stolen credit and debit card owner information * No card number	832 thousands	Full name
			Country
			State
			City
			Zip
Stolen SSN - Buysn	Personal information of SSN owners *No SSN	5.75 millions	Full name
			YOB
			City
			State
			Zip
			Country

“Passwords are like underwear...
change often, don't share...”

Stolen Accounts

Rank	E-mail Domains	Numbers	Percentage
1	yahoo.com	244,769,117	20.41%
2	hotmail.com	182,564,724	15.22%
3	gmail.com	103,435,791	8.62%
4	mail.ru	90,371,699	7.53%
5	aol.com	44,830,568	3.74%
6	yandex.ru	36,336,003	3.03%
7	rambler.ru	23,521,080	1.96%
8	hotmail.fr	16,571,495	1.38%
9	web.de	12,918,595	1.08%
10	live.com	11,661,375	0.97%
11	msn.com	11,248,354	0.94%
12	gmx.de	10,800,404	0.90%
13	163.com	10,492,032	0.87%
14	bk.ru	9,416,062	0.78%
15	yahoo.fr	8,886,223	0.74%
Total	-	817,823,522	68.18%

Popular Passwords

Rank	Passwords	Numbers
1	123456	3,370,644
2	123456789	1,187,812
3	Homelesspa*	546,648
4	password	522,529
5	abc123	516,091
6	password1	435,753
7	12345	382,970
8	qwerty	376,099
9	12345678	357,654
10	1234567	287,453
11	1234567890	252,929
12	111111	236,852
13	iloveyou	211,593
14	123456a	205,807
15	123123	191,450
Total	-	9,082,284

AZSecure Privacy Portal Design




Figure 1. AZSecure Privacy Portal Project Overview

Search in AZSecure Privacy Portal

Home About Notify Me Data Breach List Protect Yourself FAQ

AZSecure Privacy Portal

Search. Know. Act.

Search By Lee Katchen 16510 Search

We found 2 results in our breached records:

<p>lee katchen</p> <p>Phone number: unknown</p> <p>Birthyear: 1968</p> <p>Source: BuySSN</p>	<p>lee katchen</p> <p>Phone number: 631-***-****</p> <p>Birthyear: 1948</p> <p>Source: TorMarket</p>
--	--

None of these profiles match.

Matching records are returned, and the user can select the correct results.

Figure 5. A mock-up response when records are found

Return Exposed PII

Your information has been **compromised** in 1 breach:
TorMarket

What was compromised? phone number, address, birthday, home town, current town, job details, relationship status, political views, religious views

Your privacy is at **high risk** compared to others in your age group.
Your privacy risk score is **8.8**
Find out what this score means [here](#).

How do I protect myself? Find out [here](#).

Result from our database:

Platform	Leaked Attributes
TorMarket	name: lee katchen zip: 16*** address: 1234 Ma***** jobDetails: carpenter relationshipStatus: married politicalViews: moderate religiousViews: buddhist birthyear: 1948 phoneNumber: 631-***-**** city: er*****

Results from surface web search engines:

Platform	Leaked Attributes	MCA Matching Results	TF/IDF Matching Results
Zabasearch	name: Lee R Katchen state: Pennsylvania address: 5551 Fr***** birthyear: 1948 phoneNumber: 814-***-**** city: Er*****	✓	⊗
Anywho	name: Lee R Katchen state: PA address: 1024 Ap***** city: Er***** phoneNumber: 814-***-****	✓	⊗
Anywho	name: Lee R Katchen state: PA address: 3747 Bi***** Age: 52 city: Er***** phoneNumber: 814-***-****	⊗	⊗
Anywho	name: Lee R Katchen state: PA address: 3747 Bi***** city: Er***** Age: 52 phoneNumber: 814-***-****	⊗	⊗

Figure 9. Mock-ups of a comprehensive exposed PII profile

AZSecure Cybersecurity Analytics Program (2010-present): SaTC, SFS, ACI

Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC)

PROGRAM SOLICITATION

NSF 21-500

REPLACES DOCUMENT(S):
NSF 19-603



National Science Foundation

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Division of Computer and Network Systems
Division of Computing and Communication Foundations
Division of Information and Intelligent Systems
Office of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure

CyberCorps(R) Scholarship for Service (SFS) Defending America's Cyberspace

PROGRAM SOLICITATION

NSF 21-580

REPLACES DOCUMENT(S):
NSF 19-521



National Science Foundation

Directorate for Education and Human Resources
Division of Graduate Education

Cybersecurity Innovation for Cyberinfrastructure (CICI)

PROGRAM SOLICITATION

NSF 21-512

REPLACES DOCUMENT(S):
NSF 19-514



National Science Foundation

Directorate for Computer and Information Science and Engineering
Office of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure

Azsecure Cybersecurity Analytics Program: Looking into the Future

- (1) *Dark Web Analytics*** for studying international hacker community, forums, and markets;
- (2) *Privacy and PII (Personally Identifiable Information) Analytics*** for identifying and alleviating privacy risks for vulnerable populations;
- (3) *Adversarial Malware Generation and Evasion*** for adversarial AI in cybersecurity; and
- (4) *Smart Vulnerability Assessment*** for scientific workflows and OSS (Open Source Software) vulnerability analytics and mitigation.

For questions and comments

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